Reflections on European Democracy

Jean Quatremer, le correspondent du journal français Libération en Belgique et l’auteur du blogue Coulisses de Bruxelles, pense qu‘il n’y a pas de “nation francophone” en Belgique, de la même façon qu’il y a une nation flamande:

Cette journée démontre encore une fois que la crise politique actuelle n’est pas vécue de la même façon au nord et au sud du pays. S’il existe une véritable nation flamande qui envisage avec sérénité l’avènement d’un confédéralisme mou, il n’en va pas de même chez les francophones qui ne voient leur salut que dans la Belgique unie. On peut le comprendre, car la « nation » francophone n’existe pas : la division reste la règle entre Bruxellois et Wallons et entre Wallons eux-mêmes (un Liégeois ne se sent guère d’affinité avec un habitant de Charleroi).

Mais c’est pareil au côté flamand, où les gens se sentent gantois ou anversois d’abord, puis flamand, puis belge, puis européen! La différence à mon avis entre francophones et flamands, la raison pourquoi les francophones manquent de ce sentiment “national” en tant que francophones, c’est que le projet national francophone a toujours été la Belgique elle-même.

Au début déjà en 1830, la Belgique était le projet d’émancipation d’une bourgeoisie libérale qui, souvent, devait sa richesse à l’industrie développante de la Wallonie. Ça, et, dans les années précédentes, une politique linguistique des autorités napoléoniennes qui encourageait l’usage du français, a eu comme résultat que cette bourgeoisie était francophone. C’est grace à elle que la nouvelle état belge s’est doté de la constitution la plus moderne de l’Europe de cette époque. Mais c’est grace à elle aussi que la langue officielle de cet état était le français, et que l’élite administratif, économique et politique de cet état était francophone et l’est resté jusque récemment (et encore…).

Si l’émancipation flamande a abouti plus tard à l’acceptation du néerlandais à coté du français et à un pays officiellement bilingue, la côté francophone de la Belgique ne semble jamais avoir accepté qu’entre le fort et le faible, c’était la liberté linguistique du bilingualisme qui opprimait et la loi de la frontière linguistique qui, finalement, a réalisé l’égalité réelle du néerlandais et du français en Belgique.

Et c’est un peu ironique, car il ne faut que regarder le Québec pour voir un exemple où le français se trouve à l’autre côté de cette ligne.

From left to right, top to bottom:
French war graves, Verdun
American war graves, Oosterbeek (near Arnhem)
German war graves, Fricourt (Somme)
British Tyne Cot cemetery, Passchendale

This year is the Rome Treaty’s 50th anniversary - still wondering why it was a good idea?

Politics is the art of the possible. Good politics, in doing so, has a plan of the desirable. Belgian politics, it seems these days, is the art of painting yourself in a corner by planning the undesirable and desiring the impossible.

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Although progress is now being made on the less controversial dossiers (discussions on constitutional change and social security should start later this week), the political crisis in Belgium is not entirely over yet, as foreign media will be delighted to hear. But do cultural and language differences really make the country fall apart?

Some analysts think it is, and some even put Belgium on a par with Yugoslavia as proof that rising nationalism will tear the EU apart. In this view, both Belgium and the EU are elitist projects doomed to fail due to lack of support from ordinary people:

If Belgium does go down it will provide only the latest and starkest reminder of the endurance of ethnic nationalism in modern Europe and the corresponding failure of elitist supra-nationalists to forge larger identities holding any real meaning for ordinary people. (FT)

But this is way too easy. First of all, I am not at all convinced that the differences within Belgium are too big for Belgium to continue as a country. And secondly, I very much doubt that the rise of ethnic nationalism in Belgium is a bottom-up process (it was not in Yugoslavia either, by the way). (more…)

“Poll gain for Belgium’s far right“, headlines the BBC website after the municipal and provincial elections in Belgium last Sunday.

Most of its readers will have heard of the far right Vlaams Belang (VB, former Vlaams Blok) party and of the cordon sanitaire with which traditional parties try keeping it outside local council government. Despite - or as a result of - the cordon however, VB has been gaining votes in every election for years. Flanders, and VB stronghold Antwerp in particular, have become synonymous with the failure of traditional politicians everywhere in Europe to deal with their voters’ concerns on immigration and integration issues.

In other words, another spectacular poll gain for the Vlaams Belang fits into the picture we know. But is it correct? Well, no.

First of all, VB’s “sweeping gains” of seats in local councils are less the result of increasing support in the Flemish countryside, than of the fact that it actually put up any candidates in those places. In most places where VB candidates stood for election, people did not vote for them in larger numbers than they did on previous occasions when they could vote for VB candidates.

Second, compared to the last elections in 2004, VB lost votes - for the first time in history. In the 2004 regional elections, VB had 24.15% of the votes in the Flanders region. This year, in the provincial elections which use exactly the same constituencies as the regional ones, VB gained only 20.6% of the votes cast in Flanders. VB lost in all provinces, including its powerbase Antwerp where it gained 28.4% (province) and 33.51% (city) of the votes, compared to 30.07% (province) and 34.88 (city) in 2004.

So, indeed, VB still has good scores. But the good news of these elections is that, for the first time, its rise seems to have been stopped. At least for the moment…

Update: More on the Belgian elections in Guy’s post at AFOE.

Montenegro. If the polls are right, 55.3% of the votes in the referendum today were for independence. With 85% turnout this would mean that both of the EU requirements for a “valid” outcome (50% turnout, 55% majority) are met.

But independence? Let’s say it was a vote on identity and legitimacy, rather than independence.
The country has 600,000 inhabitants. Opponents of independence argue that, economically or politically, there is no way in which it will function independently. This is of course true, although it is equally true for almost any much larger country - so this argument does not necessarily hold.

Many proponents of independence seem to think that an independent Montenegro will more easily be accepted as an EU member than the current union with Serbia. This argument only holds if the prospect of Montenegro splitting off does not lead to civic unrest or worse, after all about a third of the inhabitants identify themselves as “Serb” rather than “Montenegrin”. A violent outcome is however not expected by most observers, thanks not least to the fall of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade and the normalisation that has taken place there since.

In this sense, a non-violent outcome sort of defeats the pro-independence argument that an early EU membership is more likely without Serbia than with it. The EU has also become less keen on taking in new members, and will certainly hesitate to accept Montenegro as a member without at the same time agreeing on a long-term settlement for Serbia. Most likely, any agreement on Montenegrin accession to the EU would come with an agreement on Serbian accession a few years later - or not at all.

Still, it may be wrong to conclude that this whole independence episode is all about becoming an EU member a few years earlier. Identity and legitimacy have become determining factors in elections all over Europe, as voters feel increasingly uncomfortable with the speed at which the world around them is perceived to be changing. As a result they rally against any outside influence that symbolises this change: globalisation in France, immigration in the Netherlands, Denmark and (perhaps now) Britain, the EU in (again) France and the Netherlands, gays and foreign investors in Poland.

With this in mind, regionalists could argue that rallying around local independence movements is not the worst way in which electorates can deal with globalisation fears, especially if seperation from the larger state is accompanied with an opening up to the rest of the world. The result in this case is a government that is more legitimate because people identify with it more easily, and which is, as a result, more effective when it comes to tackling the problems posed by globalisation on their behalf.

This could be the positive outcome of today’s vote in Montenegro.

Technorati Tags: montenegro, serbia, EU, regionalism, globalisation, immigration, independence

Will Belarus, Europe’s last remaining dictatorship, go the same way as Georgia and Ukraine? One can only hope so. Although this time, I have a feeling that the regime’s propaganda-based support is too strong, and that the demonstrators are too few. Sadness and anxiety prevail when I see their courage and optimism.

Still, for those who want to stay informed on recent events, here are a few links:

• Charter 97 (EN). Opposition website, often off-line
• Charter 97 (RU). Mirror site outside Belarus
• Zubr (EN). Activist website
• Multclub (EN/RU). Cartoons on the president and the regime
• Belarus blog (EN). Blog by Belarussian expat Andrei Khrapavitski
• Tobias on Belarus (EN). By Swedish liberal activist Tobias Ljungvall
• Orange Revolution Belarus (EN)
• Recent photos on Flickr.com.